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6. US corporations in globalization 
John B. Davis and Joseph P. Daniels 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The major force affecting corporations and economic institutions over the last 
two decads is globalization. A recent survey of the members of the American 
Economic Association, interpreted by Pryor (2000) reveals that economists 
see globalization as that factor (out of ten) most likely to have a major impact 
on the economic system or its important institutions. In contrast to past 
theories of trade, where firms could choose between exporting goods or 
exporting capital, that is, producing abroad, globalization has given rise to a 
'disintegration of the production process in which manufacturing or service 
activities done abroad are combined with those performed at home' (Feenstra, 
1998, p. 31). Hence, the old views of location of production activity are no 
longer appropriate and relationships between trade, investment and 
production activity are much more complex. 
In the broadest sense, corporate governance consists of an interrelated set 
of mechanisms relating boards of directors, ownership structures, institutional 
and relational investors, and government and other stakeholder groups that 
influence firm-level decisions over resoure allocation aim~ at maxi~ing 
shareholders' returns. I The purpose of this chapter is to understand these firm-
level decisions in terms of the evolution and extent of globalization of US 
industries as revealed by trade, production and investment data, and relate 
these findings to theories regarding different systems of corporate 
governance. We offer a number of insights into how the distinctive 
characteristics of the US corporate governance system have helped US firms 
respond to opportunities presented by global integration through changes in 
trade, production and investment activities. We do not present original 
empirical work, but rather use the empirical findings of other studies to throw 
light on the US system. We also conclude that further research based on a 
similar attempt to link evidence and theories will require much more 
disaggregated data. 
We begin our analysis in Section 2 by considering the duality of forces at 
work, the strategic pursuit of profits as influenced by the corporate 
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governance system and the pressures and opportunities of increased 
globalization. Section 3 examines the extent of globalization of US industries, 
quantifying the trade and investment channels of the process, as well as the 
disintegration of the production process and increased global outsourcing. In 
Sections 4 and 5 we use the economic theory of corporate governance to 
explain how the US system of corporate governance influences how US frrms 
are likely to approach global competition given the strengths and weaknesses 
of that system in promoting capital investment. Section 5 relates the theories 
of capital allocation to the quantitative data presented earlier. Section 6 offers 
general conclusions on the globalization of US corporations in relation to the 
US model of governance. 
2. GLOBALIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
DUALITY OF FORCES 
As the economies of the world become increasingly integrated, the extent and 
effects of globalization have received greater and greater attention. The 
political economy literature has rightly tended to focus on the macroeconomic 
effects of globalization. Issues such as earnings inequality, employment 
security, tax base stability and the role of the welfare state challenge free trade 
positions grounded on the welfare gains from exchange (for example, Rodrik, 
1997). Less research has been done on how corporate governance influences 
global trade and investment in light of the strengths and weaknesses of 
different types of governance structures in promoting capital investment. 
As is well known, the forces of globalization and deeper integration are 
numerous and affect different industries and firms unevenly. The effects of 
globalization can be both direct and indirect, with contagion occurring far 
down the customer and supply chain. Few industries and firms, then, can 
escape the effects of globalization regardless of their choice to participate in, 
or avoid, the international arena. Hence, corporate governance nece.§sarily 
occurs in a global environment. :rnadciition, the globalization process and 
corporate governance structures each influence one another, and accordingly 
we must consider a duality of forces at work. The globalization process forces 
changes in corporate governance structures through direct and indirect 
channels, requiring that these structures adapt to the new opportunities 
available and the competition firms face, as determined by political and 
economic forces. At the same time, structures of different corporate 
governance systems influence firms' strategic approaches, and therefore the 
pace and pattern of globalization. 
In the past, US firms exercised influence over the formation of trade policy 
and management decisions of suppliers and competitors by acquiring sizable 
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market shares. More recently, however, soaring levels of US global equity 
holdings combined with the advantages of the US securities-based system of 
corporate governance have given US firms and institutions new channels of 
influence. Consider, for example, that the California Public Employees' 
Retirement System (known as Calpers) garnered support from an array of 
German pension funds, and forced changes in the two-tier shareholder 
structure of a large German utility. Steinmetz and Sesit (1999, p. 1) comment 
that the most significant effect of the surge in US global equity investment is 
that it 'forces European companies to change the way they do business and 
adopt American corporate values'. 
Regarding corporate governance, we distinguish between management 
thinking on corporate governance, and appropriate an international political 
economy perspective and the economic analysis of corporate governance, 
based on the theory of efficient capital allocation. An economic analysis of 
corporate governance explains how principal-agent and insider-outsider 
relationships affect firms' investment plans and, therefore, location of 
production activity. Management thinking on corporate governance, built 
upon general systems theory, describes how firms may be constrained by 
possible conflicts with stakeholders, or groups affected by, and/or that can 
affect, a firm's decisions, policies and operations. Though we focus on the 
economic perspective, we contend that both perspectives are necessary, since 
one reflects how unhindered firms would choose to invest domestically and 
internationally, while the other reflects the political economic realities 
involved in globalization. 
The US system of corporate governance is a securities-based system of 
corporate governance (sometimes called a neoclassical system of regulation) 
which favours competitive capital markets, discourages intercorporate 
cooperation, tips the balance of power between shareholders and corporate 
management in the direction of the former, and tends to be associated with a 
relatively unconcentrated corporate ownership structure, all reinforced by a 
competition policy based in antitrust law. We argue that the US system of 
corporate governance creates strong incentives for US firms involved in 
certain types of production to avoid regulatory exposure through foreign 
operations, while US firms involved in other types of production will have 
weak incentives to do so. These developments, it should be noted, need not be 
consistent with US macromanagement goals (cf. Daniels and Davis, 2000). 
3. THE EXTENT OF US GLOBALIZATION: TRADE, 
PRODUCTION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT 
[Dunning (1993, p. 54) argues that the activities of multinational enterprises 
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are motivated by stakeholder interest, where stakeholders include employees, 
management and shareholders. In contrast, neoclassical economic theory 
asserts that residual income accrues to a firm's shareholders in the form of 
profits paid as dividends, and that therefore profits motivate the actions of the 
firm (and its managers). In discussing the 'OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance' Emmons and Schmid (Chapter 2, this volume) observe that both 
shareholder and stakeholder rights are acknowledged, but ask whether 
conflict between the two is not inevitable. Dunning also stresses that multi-
national activities may produce conflict between shareholders and stake-
holders. Further, globalization strategies and the various exposures to risk 
globalization may generate considerable stress between these constituencies 
'even when each includes profit maximization in their objective functions. 
Hence, globalizing firms may pursue a variety of different paths reflecting 
conflict over both objectives and strategies. 
Trade economists have generally considered two routes of global 
expansion; globalizing through trade or globalizing through foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Traditionally these strategies were viewed as being separate 
or alternative means to globalization. That is, the exports of goods and capital 
substitute for each other. Recent theoretical (for example, Markusen and 
Venables, 1995) and empirical research (for example, Fontagne and Pajot, 
1997) show that the relationship between trade and foreign direct investment 
is much more complex, and that trade and foreign direct investment may 
actually complement each other. That is, foreign direct investment may spur 
greater amounts of trade, and trade may spur greater amounts of foreign direct 
investment. Hence, the pursuit of profit maximization and the attempt to 
balance various stakeholder groups may well require a mixed approach to 
globalization. The approach in some industries may be increased trade 
channels, in others the acquisition of a controlling share in a foreign establish-
ment, and yet others a mix of both. 
There is a further reason that the relationship between trade and investment 
is complex. Global integration may be accompanied by a 'disintegration' of 
the production process (Feenstra, 1998, p. 31) whereby a formerly integrated 
domestic production activity becomes fragmented a~ portions of the 
production process are outsourced to foreign production. This outsourcing 
activity allows firms to concentrate on the highest value-added portions of the 
total production process, making many US firms only responsible for 
final stages of production. This complicates our standard model of 
comparative advantage which explains advantage in terms of final goods and 
services. In effect, a US manufacturing firm may find that it has a 
comparative advantage in high value-added stages such as design and 
marketing, but a comparative disadvantage in mass production. This 
may not be reflected in industry-level data, and thus makes clear-cut 
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conclusions about trade, production and investment difficult, though not 
impossible. 
3.1 Manufacturing 
We begin our analysis of the evidence by considering global integration in the 
manufacturing sector. We are not concerned with defining globalization or 
integration per se. Neither do we classify industries as domestic or global 
(see, for example, Makhija and Williamson, 2000). Rather we consider 
industries along a continuum from relatively low to relatively high degrees of 
integration. 
3.1.1 Integration of the manufacturing sector 
Campa and Goldberg (1997) examine the external orientation of 
manufacturing in four different countries by considering the share of exports, 
imports and imported inputs for 20 categories of manufactures. The purpose 
of their study is to ascertain the exposure of these industries to international 
events such as changes in trade policies and exchange rates. Their results are 
particularly interesting in that they illustrate both direct and indirect 
exposures that may exist from globalization. Direct exposures refer to 
changes that affect the firm directly through effects on its price competitive-
ness or costs of inputs used in the production process. Indirect exposures refer 
to changes that affect the firm'indirectly by impacting upon the firm's 
competition, suppliers and customers. 
Campa and Goldberg capture direct exposure by measuring the extent to 
which an industry relies on exports and imported inputs. They capture part of 
a firm's indirect exposure through the degree of import competition. The 
levels of these shares are provided in Table 6.1 as are the changes in these 
shares over a 20-year period. 
Campa and Goldberg calculate each industry's external orientation by 
netting the export and imported-input shares. The rationale for this measure is 
that it shows how export-oriented firms are at least partially insulated against 
exchange rate movements. For example, a firm facing appreciation of its 
currency and loss of export sales, benefits from the reduced domestic 
currency cost of imported inputs. Industries with the highest external 
orientation, such as instruments and related products (15 per cent), industrial 
machinery and equipment (14.8 per cent), electronic and other electrical 
equipment (12.6 per cent), and tobacco products (11.9 per cent), do not rely 
heavily on imported inputs, and therefore may be hurt by a domestic currency 
appreciation. Goldberg and Crockett (1998) claim that industries with more 
labour-intensive production processes are likely to have a lower imported-
input share and, therefore, a higher external orientation. Comparing capital 
Table 6.1 Export and import market shares for manufacturing, 1995 
Export Import Imported- Change in Change in Change in 
share share input share export share* import share* input share* 
Food and kindred products 5.9 4.2 4.2 2.6 0.5 1.4 
Tobacco products 14.9 0.6 2.1 8.0 0.0 0.7 
Textile mill products 7.6 9.1 7.3 2.5 4.8 4.3 
Apparel and other textiles 7.4 31.4 3.2 5.4 22.9 1.9 
Lumber and wood products 7.6 10.3 4.3 0.4 3.4 2.1 
Furniture and fixtures 5.5 14.1 5.7 4.2 11.1 2.1 
Paper and allied products 9.0 10.0 6.3 3.1 4.1 2.1 
Printing and publishing 2.4 1.6 3.5 0.8 0.6 0.8 
...... 
Chemicals and allied products 15.8 11.0 6.3 5.7 7.4 3.3 
\Q Petroleum and coal products 3.9 5.7 5.3 2.2 -4.0 -1.5 IJJ 
Rubber and miscellaneous products 9.2 12.8 5.3 4.4 7.9 2.6 
Leather and leather products 14.4 59.5 20.5 10.5 41.8 14.9 
S tone, clay and glass products 5.6 9.5 4.7 2.2 6.1 2.6 
Primary metal products 11.2 17.4 10.6 6.1 7.6 5.6 
Fabricated metal products 7.9 8.5 8.7 1.6 5.5 4.0 
Industrial machinery and equipment 25.8 27.8 11.0 2.5 21.5 6.9 
Electronic and other electric equipment 24.2 32.5 11.6 13.1 24.0 7.1 
Transportation equipment 17.8 24.3 15.7 2.0 13.9 9.3 
Instruments and related products 21.3 20.1 6.3 4.5 12.7 2.5 
Other manufacturing 13.5 41.1 9.9 3.6 27.7 5.3 
Total manufacturing 13.4 16.3 8.2 5.0 10.0 4.1 
Note: * Change from 1975 level. 
Source: Campa and Goldberg (1997, p. 57). 
196 Corporate governance and globalization 
expenditure-labour unit ratios with the external orientation measure, as 
shown in Table 6.2, does not reveal such a pattem.2 Goldberg and Crockett 
also argue that exchange rate changes disproportionately affect profitability 
and investment spending in industries with the highest external orientation. 
Table 6.2 Capital expenditure to labour unit and external orientation 
Leather and leather products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Printing and publishing 
Fabricated metal products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Textile mill products 
Primary metal industries 
Stone, clay and glass products 
Food and kindred products 
Transportation equipment 
Paper and. allied products 
Lumber and wood products 
Misc. manufacturing industries 
Rubber and misc. plastics· products 
Apparel and other textile products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Electronic and other electric equipment 
Tobacco products 
Industrial machinery and equipment 
Instruments and related products 
Capital 
expenditures 
to labour 
1 386.8 
50971.5 
4293.8 
5407.6 
2654.8 
4538.8 
11 383.4 
9114.9 
8058.2 
8916.3 
15355.6 
5061.9 
3861.6 
7670.5 
1 192.7 
24927.2 
15081.0 
18837.2 
6696.0 
6698.4 
External 
orientation 
-6.1 
-1.4 
-1 1 
-0.8 
-0.2 
0.3 
0.6 
0.9 
1.7 
2.1 
2.7 
3.3 
3.6 
3.9 
4.2 
9.5 
12.6 
12.8 
14.8 
15.0 
The data for all three measures shows that manufacturing has become much 
more integrated in the global economy over the 20-year period, as the share 
of exports increased an additional 5 per cent representing a 60 per cent gain 
overall. The share of imports increased an additional 10 per cent, a 159 per 
cent increase, while the share of imported inputs doubled to 8.2 per cent. 
Campa and Goldberg further compare the ranking of the twenty industries for 
the three share measures over the 20-year period. The industry rank 
correlations are positive and significant, indicating that the most export-
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oriented industries remained so over the entire period. Likewise, the most 
import-oriented remained so, though the increase in import shares differs 
significantly across industries. The authors find that the difference in the 
import shares widens considerably with import penetration increasing at a 
much faster rate in high import-share industries, such as leather and leather 
products, as compared to low import-share industries, such as tobacco and 
printing and publishing. Using Spearman rank correlations, we find that 
capital expenditures-labour unit ratios and changes in import shares are 
significant and negative indicating that the increasing spread in import 
penetration falls disproportionately on labour-intensive industries - industries 
in which the US is at a comparative disadvantage. 
3.1.2 Disintegration of production in manufacturing 
The industry import and export shares cited above do not reveal the extent of 
international trade in intermediate products. Advances in technology, 
particularly communications technology, coupled with reductions in transpor-
tation costs have allowed firms to outsource various stages of the production 
process, and focus on those segments of the value-added chain in which the 
firm has a comparative advantage. For firms in the US, this means 
increasingly that the manufacturing component of production is contracted 
out to foreign sources, allowing traditional manufacturing enterprises to 
concentrate on such high value-added activities as design and marketing. 
Firms such as Ford now see their future in design, branding, marketing and 
service operations, as opposed to automobile manufacture and traditional final 
assembly (Burt, 1999). Others, relying on new information technology 
combined with robotics and advanced production techniques, concentrate on 
'mass customization' or customization of products on a large scale. Huffy, for 
example, recently announced that the last of its US bicycle plants would shut 
down, completing the firm's evolution into a 'multibrand design, marketing 
and distribution company' (Aeppel, 1999, p. AI). 
Evidence that outsourcing has become more important for the United States 
is suggested by the rising ratio of US merchandise trade (the average of 
imports and exports) to merchandise value-added since the 1980s (Irwin, 
1996). A higher ratio of merchandise trade to value-added indicates a greater 
share of imported inputs in final product value. Also, that advanced countries' 
final product value tends to be high relative to final product value in 
developing countries suggests that a higher share of imported inputs reflects 
inputs having a higher degree of processing. Further evidence that this higher 
share may reflect an increasing tendency on the part of advanced countries to 
outsource the low-wage stages of the production process associated with light 
assembly and manufacturing, while retaining domestically the high-wage 
portions of the production process associated with design and more complex, 
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less standardized forms of manufacture, comes from changing shares of US 
exports and imports by end-use categories. To estimate the extent of 
outsourcing, Feenstra (1998), following Irwin (1996), calculates the share of 
exports and imports by ~nd-use categories for the US. For the United States, 
as shown in Table 6.3, the first half of the century saw higher shares of raw 
materials and industrial supplies in exports and imports, while since the 1980s 
manufactured goods, including capital goods, at increasingly advanced stages 
of processing, have occupied a larger share of total end-use categories. 
Thus the US appears to be importing products that are closer and closer to 
the final stage of production, allowing more and more of the earlier stages of 
the production process to occur in foreign countries. But industry-level trade 
data aggregates all stages of the production process and does not reveal the 
degree to which US firms concentrate on the high value-added stages of 
production, the stages of production in which they have a comparative 
advantage. A more thorough examination of this phenomenon would require 
us to consider firm-level data, which is generally unavailable. 
3.1.3 Foreign direct investment shares in manufacturing 
Expanded trade activity, whether vertical or horizontal, is but one path of 
globalization. Another is through foreign direct investment: investment in the 
form of capital, technology, management skills and so on, which is outside of 
the country but within the structure of the investing company (Dunning, 1993, 
p. 5). Table 6.4 provides the stock of FDI (historical basis) and share of 
outstanding stock for the 20 manufacturing industries considered in Table 6.1. 
It is important to note that the measures in Table 6.1 are flow measures as 
they reflect the flow of goods and services over the course of a given period 
whereas the measures in Table 6.4 are stock measures, indicating the level of 
accumulated direct investment. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that three 
of the five industries with the highest FDI shares (chemicals, industrial 
machinery and electronic equipment) are also in the top five for export shares, 
yet no relationship appears to exist at the bottom of the categories. In general, 
however, a positive ordinal relationship does appear to exist between FDI 
shares and export shares. No relationship is evident between FDI shares and 
import shares or imported input shares, or the changes in these shares. 
Spearman rank correlations lead us to the same conclusion.3 We conclude, 
therefore, that the relationship between trade patterns and FDI stocks are 
complex and FDI is not a clear substitute for exports. This relationship is 
revisited later in the chapter. 
3.2 Services 
The service sector is extremely important to the US economy as most recent 
Table 6.3 Shares of exports and imports by end-use categories 
Category 1925 1950 1965 1980 1995 
Foods, feeds and beverages Imports 21.9 30.0 19.1 11.3 5.0 
Exports 18.7 15.5 19.2 16.9 9.2 
Industrial supplies and materials Imports 68.2 62.4 53.3 31.3 18.2 
-
Exports 59.8 45.5 34.8 32.2 25.6 
'0 
\0 Capital goods (except autos) Imports 0.4 1.3 7.1 19.0 33.6 
Exports 8.7 22.4 31.4 35.0 42.4 
Consumer goods (except autos) Imports 9.4 6.1 16.0 21.5 24.3 
Exports 6.0 8.9 7.0 7.8 11.7 
Automotive vehicles and parts Imports 0.02 0.3 4.5 16.9 18.9 
Exports 6.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 11.2 
Source: Feenstra (1998). 
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Table 6.4 Stock and shares of FDI for manufacturing, 1995 
Industry classificatic)O 
Food and kindred products 
Tobacco products 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other textiles 
Lumber and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing 
Chemicals and allied products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber and miscellaneous products 
Leather and leather products 
Stone, clay and glass products 
Primary metal products 
Fabricated metal products 
Industrial machinery and equipment 
Electronic and other electric equipment 
Transportation equipment 
Instruments and related products 
Other manufacturing 
Total manufacturing 
Note: *MilIions of US$. Historical cost basis. 
FDI stock* 
28896 
3962 
1 538 
1 248 
1 861 
805 
11 748 
2344 
61 374 
19597 
5291 
134 
2786 
3927 
7628 
29626 
27514 
34076 
11 676 
7520 
243954 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, international Accounts Data. 
FDI share 
11.8 
1.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.8 
0.3 
4.8 
1.0 
25.2 
8.0 
2.2 
0.1 
1.1 
1.6 
3.1 
12.1 
11.3 
14.0 
4.8 
3.1 
100.0 
figures show (OEeD, 1999a) that services contribute over 70 per cent of 
GDP whereas manufacturing contributes slightly more than 18 per cent. 
It is unfortunate, however, that private services transactions and US direct 
investment abroad are not classified the same and are not directly 
comparable.4 Table 6.5 provides the export and import shares of total private 
services for the 11 broad categories used by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
Table 6.6 provides the levels and shares of foreign direct investment for the 
major categories tracked by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Because the import and export shares and FDr shares are not directly 
comparable, there is little we can draw from their patterns. We note, however, 
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Table 6.S Industry share of total private services exports and imports, 1995 
Private services transactions Share of total Share of total 
exports imports 
Travel 31.1 34.2 
Passenger fares 9.4 10.7 
Other transportation 13.4 21.0 
Royalties and licence fees 13.4 4.8 
Affiliated services 9.9 10.1 
Education 3.7 0.7 
Financial services 3.4 1.8 
Insurance, net 0.7 4.0 
Telecommunications 1.6 5.8 
Business, professional and technical 8.7 3.5 
Other 4.8 3.3 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Private Services Transactions by Type. 
the importance of exports to business services. We also note that the overall 
stock of FDI in finance and services is slightly higher than in manufacturing, 
though one would expect this to be a recent phenomenon. The relatively high 
FDI shares in finance, insurance and business are also apparent. 
3.3 The Link Between FDI, 1rade and Production Activity 
The data presented thus far shows that there are complex relationships among 
trade, FDI and production activity. To add further support to this while trying 
to clear the picture as much as possible, we next present data on the 
geographical distribution of FDI and recent empirical evidence on the 
relationship between trade and FDI. 
3.3.1 The geographical distribution of FDI 
The geographical pattern of FDI is likely to vary across sectors as were 
export, import and FDI shares. Table 6.7 provides recent data on the 
geographical distribution of FDI stocks, delineating between the service 
sector and manufacturing sector. 
The geographical pattern of FDI stocks reveals the concentration of 
investment in the United Kingdom and Canada. For manufacturing, these two 
countries account for 32 per cent of the share of FDI among the top 15 
destinations. For the service sector FDI stocks are even more concentrated in 
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Table 6.6 Stock and shares of FDI for finance and services, 1995 
Industry classification FDI stock* PDI share 
Finance 68 135 27.5 
Insurance 32767 13.2 
Real estate 1 194 0.5 
Holding companies 11 6217 46.9 
Services 
Hotels and lodging 2044 0.8 
Business services 15043 6.1 
Automotive rental and leasing 2795 1.1 
Motion pictures 1 682 0.7 
Health services 267 0.1 
Engineering 1 094 0.4 
Management and public relations 2354 0.9 
Other 
Au tomotive parking and repair 68 0.0 
Miscellaneous repair 235 0.1 
Amusement and recreational 1 076 0.4 
Legal services 145 0.1 
Education 41 0.0 
Accounting and auditing 225 0.1 
Research and development 980 0.4 
Other commercial services 1 670 0.7 
Total finance and services 248032 
Note: *MiIlions of US$. Historical cost basis. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, international Accounts Data. 
Canada and the United Kingdom as their combined share is in excess of 40 
per cent. In addition, US FDI stocks are highly concentrated in the developed 
economies, particularly so in the service sector with 95 per cent of stocks 
located in Canada and the ED. Though the developed economies account for 
the majority of FDI stocks in both manufacturing and services, and though 
Canada and the United Kingdom are the top two nations in each sector, rank 
correlations show no significant relation among the pattern of nations across 
the two sectors. Hence, location strategies are likely to differ between the 
service and manufacturing sectors. 
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Table 6.7 Geographical distribution ofFDI for manufacturing and services, 
levels and shares, 1995 
Manufacturing FDI* FDI Services FDI* FDI 
stock share stock share 
Canada 41 248 19.0 United Kingdom 5764 24.1 
United Kingdom 27865 12.9 Canada 4014 16.8 
Germany 23671 10.9 Belgium 2829 11.8 
Brazil 17651 8.1 France 2324 9.7 
Japan 16664 7.7 Switzerland 1 440 6.0 
France 16555 7.6 Italy 1 257 5.2 
Netherlands 10451 4.8 Australia 1055 4.4 
Sweden 10377 4.8 Netherlands 1040 4.3 
Italy 9822 4.5 Germany 955 4.0 
Mexico 8856 4.1 Japan 686 2.9 
Belgium 8508 3.9 Denmark 651 2.7 
Australia 8466 3.9 Ireland 621 2.6 
Ireland 6894 3.2 Sweden 488 2.0 
Spain 5806 2.7 Spain 421 1.8 
Switzerland 3843 1.8 Mexico 412 1.7 
Note: * Millions of US$. Historical cost basis. 
Source: von der Ruhr (1999), 
3.3.2 The impact of FDI on bilateral trade flows 
Traditionally FDI and exports were viewed as being substitutes to each 
other. In other words, a firm could choose between exporting goods or 
capital. Recent theoretical and empirical research show that the 
relationship between trade and foreign direct investment is much more 
complex, with trade and foreign direct investment actually complementing 
each other. 
Table 6.8 provides recent empirical evidence by Fontagne and Pajot ( 1998) 
on the impact of FDIflows on trade for the manufacturing sector. Because the 
authors consider FDI flows, the results below indicate the impact of bilateral 
FDI flows on bilateral trade. Countries in the columns are the exporting 
countries and countries in the rows are importing countries. The measures are 
generated from log-linear export equations that control for such things as 
market distance, income levels and market sizes, and reflect the change in 
trade flows resulting from the bilateral FDI flows. 
As an example, the table indicates that Japan's exports to the United States 
Table 6.8 Trade creation resulting from bilateral FDI flows. 1994 
US Japan Gennany UK France Italy Netherlands Denmark Sweden Switzerland Spain Canada Australia 
US 86 70 98 63 35 0 7 14 47 18 99 17 
Japan 149 12 22 5 2 16 2 8 13 
Germany 9 1 38 21 -7 20 0 -3 8 0 0 
UK 101 3 21 14 9 62 2 9 -1 8 -3 33 
France 42 2 19 35 14 15 -2 6 7 2 0 
N Italy 6 1 4 7 11 14 0 3 4 1 0 ~ Netherlands 17 0 17 38 7 6 20 20 3 3 
Denmark 11 0 3 13 2 0 5 9 2 10 0 
Sweden 10 1 -4 6 -10 0 58 15 7 0 
Switzerland 47 -2 16 23 11 1 11 } 8 -} 1 0 
Spain 21 3 15 -1 14 9 12 0 0 0 
Canada 86 6 -14 
Australia 20 2 0 29 3 3 2 
Note: Expressed as a percentage, the additional trade created by bilateral FDI flows. 
Source: Fontagne and Pajot (1998). 
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are 149 per cent higher than they would have been in lieu of bilateral FDI 
flows. In turn, US exports to Japan are 86 per cent higher than they would 
have been without the bilateral FDI flows. Hence, the US's FDI relationship 
with Japan results in a trade deficit as the FDI flows generate more exports to 
the US than imports to Japan. In contrast, the bilateral FDI flows between the 
United States and Canada and the United Kingdom, whose importance is 
demonstrated in the previous table, appear to be trade-balance neutral as they 
spur roughly equal amounts of imports and exports. What is evident in the 
table is that the bilateral FDI flows complement US imports and exports as 
opposed to substituting for them. The authors conclude that because exports 
increase, rather than being substituted for, US FDI results in greater US 
competitiveness in foreign markets boosting exports from home. Likewise the 
increase generated in imports reflects global relocations strategies with 
exports from foreign subsidiaries to home. 
Fontagne and Pajot consider FDI stocks as well as FDI flows. The 
complementary relationships hold for stocks as well as each dollar of outward 
FDI stock results in 70 cents of new exports and $1.3 of imports. Hence, 
outward US FDI stocks are trade-deficit generating. Inward FOI stock, on the 
other hand, has a net substitution effect as each $1 of inward stock results in 
a 16 cent decline in imports and a 10 cent decline in exports. Fontagne and 
Pajot (1997) include FDI stock for: services in these estimates and find that the 
negative trade effect of outward FDI and the positive effect of inward FDI 
disappear. The authors reason that FDI in services pertain to subsidiaries in 
wholesale trade which explains this outcome. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Our general conclusions in this section are summarized as follows: 
• Manufacturing has become much more integrated in the global 
economy. Market shares of export, imports, and imported inputs have 
all increased significantly since 1975. 
• The most export-oriented and the most import-oriented industries in 
1975 remained so over the last 20 years. 
• Import penetration increased at a much faster rate for high-import share 
industries than low-import share industries. 
(a) Changes in import shares are negatively related to the industry's 
capital-labour ratio. Hence, increasing rate of import penetration 
fall disproportionately on labour-intensive industries. 
• The rising ratio of US merchandise trade to merchandise value-added 
206 Corporate governance and globalization 
indicates that outsourcing has become more important for the United 
States. Data on the share of exports and imports by end~use categories 
confirms this conclusion. Hence: 
(a) The US is importing products that are closer to the final stage of 
production and concentrating on the high value~added stages of 
production. 
(b) The phenomenon of outsourcing clouds the industry-level data 
as comparative advantage now takes place at a level of 
production rather than at the industry level. Firm-level data is 
required to conduct a more thorough examination. 
• Manufacturing industries with the highest FDI shares (chemicals, 
industrial machinery, electronics) tend to have the highest export shares. 
(a) Overall, a positive ordinal relationship exists between FDI 
shares and export shares. 
(b) There is not an apparent relationship between FDI shares and 
import and imported-input shares. 
(c) Hence, the relationship between trade and FDI appears to be 
more complex than the traditional export substitution hypothesis. 
• US manufacturing FDI shares are highly concentrated in the United 
Kingdom and Canada, and even more so in the service sector. Canada 
and Europe account for a high share of FDI stocks, particularly in 
services. 
(a) Though Canada and the United Kingdom are the top two 
locations of US POI stocks, rank correlations between 
manufacturing and services do not verify an ordinal relationship 
among the pattern of nations. 
• Bilateral FDI flows between the US and partner countries have 
differing effects on the US trade balance. 
• Bilateral FDI flows are complements to both US imports and exports. 
Hence, FDI flows result in greater US competitiveness abroad in 
addition to global relocation strategies which result in exports from 
foreign subsidiaries. 
• Outward US manufacturing POI stocks complement US exports and 
imports whereas inward FDI stocks substitute for both imports and 
exports. Adding service stocks mitigates the trade deficit effects of 
outflows and positive trade effect of inflows. 
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In a more general sense, the evidence above shows that US corporations 
have effectively pursued globalization strategies over the last 30 years. In 
regard to production activity and FOI, outsourcing of low-value-added stages 
of production has become more important to US corporations While FDI 
continues to be directed to developed nations. In addition, FDI appears to 
complement trade as opposed to substituting for it. We conclude, therefore. 
that FDI strategies are primarily driven by ownership characteristics with 
acquired assets, whether tangible or intangible, complementing the 
corporation's existing comparative advantage. 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL 
ALLOCATION: ALTERNATIVE MODESs 
The economic theory of corporate governance is rooted in theories of efficient 
allocation of capital. Efficient allocation of capital depends first upon 
investors having the knowledge needed to correctly estimate the expected 
return and risk of available investment portfolios. (1) Misallocation costs 
arise in the absence of such knowledge when scarce capital is not allocated to 
its highest yield use, and reflect costly efforts on the part of investors to 
acquire better knowledge regarding future states of the world and their 
probabilities. But capital markets also link investors who provide capital to 
firms which use it for investment purposes, so that the efficient allocation of 
capital also depends upon the relationship between investors and firms. 
(2) Governance costs are incurred when investors and corporate executives 
pursue conflicting goals. and adopt costly measures to achieve their respective 
goals. They include: (2a) agency costs (Jensen and Meckling. 1976; Spence. 
1973; Stiglitz, 1975), including signalling costs on the part of finns seeking 
to demonstrate reliability and trustworthiness to investors and screening! 
monitoring costs on the part of investors; and (2b) non-diversification costs 
incurred by investors who increase their degree of governance in order to 
lower screening and monitoring costS.6 
Alternative modes of capital allocation and corporate governance may be 
distinguished according to the different regulatory regimes cQuntries adopt to 
manage misallocation costs and governance costs. Dietl (1998, pp. 23ft) 
identifies two polar extremes in a wide spectrum of regulatory regimes. 
neoclassical and relational. systems of regulation, and uses these polar 
extremes and a hybrid combination of the two to characterize the US, German 
and Japanese modes of capital allocation and corporate governance. 
Neoclassical regulation, based on theoretical neoclassical economics, 
emphasizes allocative efficiency and competitive capital markets, and 
concentrates on removing capital market imperfections due to infonnation 
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asymmetries, manipulated markets and market power, Information 
asymmetries are addressed through accounting, disclosure and auditing rules, 
manipulated markets by prohibiting insider trading, and market power with 
anti-takeover laws and prohibition of universal banking (separation of 
commercial and investment banking). The latter combined with strict 
diversification requirements prevents financial intermediaries from acquiring 
control over non-financial institutions. Competitive capital markets are 
consequently associated with ownership fragmentation. One consequence of 
this is that investors do not commit themselves to long-term investment 
relations, since inability to earn governance rents means that investors 
discount future cash flows at high rates. Another consequence is that small 
corporations have good access to capital markets, since investors are 
protected by accounting, disclosure and auditing rules, insider restrictions, 
and so on. 
Relational regulation, based on the property rights literature, focuses on 
governance efficiency and the economics of governance. Ownership 
concentration and market manipulation are not considered capital market 
imperfections, but rather as means of economizing on governance costs. 
Ownership fragmentation favoured in neoclassical regulation is seen as likely 
to attenuate property rights, and discourage efficient investments in 
governance and control. Concentrated ownership internalizes governance 
costs while it limits risk diversification. To compensate for undiversified 
investment portfolios, higher. returns to investments in governance are 
needed. This implies weak accounting, disclosure and auditing rules, an 
absence of prohibitions against insider trading and market manipulation, and 
takeover-oriented regulations. Universal banking, the combination of 
commercial and investment banking, is also favoured in order to protect 
highly· specific investments in corporate governance. Banks acquire greater 
ability to govern loans to non-banks, while the latter avoid credit rationing 
and undergo smoother restructuring when in financial distress. The resulting 
investment perspective is long term in contrast to neoclassical regulation. 
Comparing actual national systems of regulation in terms of how well they 
address misallocation costs and governance costs requires that we consider 
the types of industrial production in which they specialize. Two characteristics 
of indus~al development are central to this evaluation: industry maturity and 
investment plasticity. (1) Industry maturity occurs when market expansion is 
limited. and typically occurs at the expense of competitors, product 
improvement is gradual and insiders have large amounts of knowledge for 
predicting the return and risk of new investments (for example, auto, steel). 
Immatpre industries have low entry barriers and high rates of innovation, 
while instability reduces the advantage of insider knowledge (for example, 
biotechnology, telecommunications, entertainment, financial services). 
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(2) Investment plasticity (Alchian and Woodward, 1987) concerns the 
relationship between the investor as principal and corporate executives as 
agents. High investment plasticity is associated with discretionary use of 
investment funds on the part of corporate executives, and occurs most 
commonly in industries especially reliant on human skills (for example, 
research laboratories, software, education). More technologically rigid 
industries (for example, mining, rail, power generation) have more implastic 
investments as investments are more clearly dedicated to identifiable 
purposes. 
Here we focus on what these two industrial characteristics specifically 
imply about national systems of regulation that tend toward the neoclassical 
end of the spectrum, since this best describes the US case with which we are 
concerned.7 Though US anti-trust law dates from the beginning of the century, 
much important legislation dates from the Depression of the 1930s. Key 
shareholder-oriented laws include: the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act which require registration and extensive disclosure 
concerning securities offerings, provide criminal penalties for false and 
misleading statements, and prohibit insider trading and market manipulation; 
the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and subsequent laws that separate commercial 
and investment banking; and in the 1980s a variety of Supreme Court 
decisions allowing states to pass anti-takeover laws. In general, small 
investors in the US have many protections and corporate ownership is highly 
fragmented compared to Germany and Japan. 
As a result of these laws and regulations, the US capital market is the 
largest in the world, yet US banks are not large relative to their German and 
Japanese counterparts. US holding companies are different from German joint 
stock companies and the Japanese equivalent (kabushiki-kaisha) in being 
subject to anti-trust regulation, so that intercorporate relationships are less 
common in the US. Finally, in recent years the power of corporate insiders has 
been increasingly curtailed through the greater presence of outside directors 
on corporate boards, a greater role for institutional and relational investors, 
shareholder resolutions, separation of CEO and board chair functions, and so 
on. 
(1) Mature VS. immature industries. Neoclassical systems of regulation such 
as the US system are likely to have lower misallocation and governance costs 
in connection with immature rather than mature industries. In immature 
industries with considerable innovation and product development, the 
neoclassical system of regulation has low misallocation costs because 
competitive capital markets transmit knowledge on the part of outside 
investors, who have an informational advantage over insiders. Governance 
costs of the screening/monitoring variety are low, because accounting, 
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auditing and disclosure rules protect small investors and limit the control of 
executives. At the same time, accounting, auditing and disclosure rules also 
reduce signalling costs on the part of firms seeking investment funds. In 
contrast, since in mature industries insider knowledge is necessary and 
outside investors are at an informational disadvantage, a system that 
encourages their participation may actually impair allocative efficiency. In 
addition~ screening/monitoring governance costs will be high for outside 
investors when insider knowledge does not transfer readily. These latter costs 
are likely to deter investment, and thus unintermediated capital markets tend 
to direct insufficient investment funds to firms. 
One organizational response to this is the intermediation of capital markets. 
Intermediated capital markets in the form of investment banking allow 
outsiders to direct capital to mature industries, lowering both misallocation 
and screening/monitoring costs. But diversification requirements in 
neoclassical systems of regulation prevent banks from acquiring strong 
positions in non-bank fmns, and thus capital markets are still likely to under-
allocate financial resources to mature industries. Holding companies and 
multidivisional organizationsll are a further organizational response to the 
presence of mature industries in neoclassical systems of regulation, because 
they channel investment funds to insiders while allowing them flexibility in 
their use. However, anti-trust law and enforcement in neoclassical systems of 
regulation also limits this organizational response. 
(2) Plastic vs. implastic investment. Neoclassical systems of regulation 
such as the US system are also likely to have lower misallocation and 
governance costs in industries having implasti.c rather than plastic 
investments. Completely implastic investments create no governance 
problems, as screening/monitoring costs are minimized, and investors may be 
confident that executives will use investment funds as anticipated. At the 
same time, unintermediated capital markets are efficient as misallocation 
costs are minimal in the presence of accounting, auditing and disclosure rules. 
But with plastic investments fmns exercise more discretion over use of 
investment funds and high screening/monitoring costs tend to deter 
investment, producing insufficient capital flows to firms. Additionally, should 
regulations favour outsiders at the expense of insiders, high misallocation 
costs are also likely since investors are unlikely to be in a position to 
recognize best investment fund uses. 
Bank intermediation is an organizational response that may permit higher 
levels of investment in virtue of banks t specialization in screening and 
monitoring. However, diversification requirements still limit banks and other 
financial intermediaries from exercising control over non-bank fInns. Holding 
companies and multidivisional organizations are also an efficient 
organizational response, since they may integrate firms engaging in highly 
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plastic investment in larger organizations with stronger governance structures 
(especially where there are strong markets for corporate control). Again, anti-
trust law and its enforcement limit this organizational response. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR US CORPORATION 
GLOBALIZATION 
We tum to implications of this analysis for US firms in global competition. As 
a neoclassical system of regulation, we expect US firms that are successful in 
the global economy to more often be in immature industries and involved in 
implastic types of investment 
First contrast the case of mature industries. We distinguish among mature 
industries according to low or high capital expenditure-labor ratios. The US 
should have a sizable comparative disadvantage where this ratio is low, and 
we would accordingly expect the US to have low levels of POI shares and 
high import shares in these industries. Corresponding to this, the six industries 
with the lowest FDI shares (leather and leather products, furniture and 
fixtures, app~el and other textiles, textile mill products, lumber and wood 
products, and paper and allied products) also have the lowest capital-labour 
ratios. (The category of other manufacturing is the exception.) These 
industries also have the lowest external orientation, ranging from a negative 
6.1 per cent to just 4.2 per cent Alternatively, in mature industries in which 
the capital expenditure-labour ratio is high (and where economies of scale can 
be achieved), US firms may overcome comparative disadvantage by locating 
outside the reach of US laws and regulations. While US fIrms are prevented 
from forming domestic intercorporate relationships by antitrust law, they may 
form joint ventures in foreign markets (recent examples include 
DaimlerChrysler, and Mattel-Bandai). This would imply high levels of 
foreign direct investment in such industries, and indeed we fmd that five of 
the six industries with the highest FDI shares (chemicals and allied products, 
petroleum and coal products, food and kindred products, electronic equipment 
and transportation equipment) have among the highest (top half) capital-
labour ratios. (Industrial machinery is the exception.) Other than food and 
petroleum, these industries also have high export shares. However, their 
respective external orientation varies. 
In the case of immature industries where US antitrust law is not at issue, we 
expect FDI to be low, both because there is no need to escape US laws and 
regulations, and because the domestic market is still being developed. We take 
engineering, management, legal, accounting and research and development 
services to be examples of immature industries, and find that their FOI shares 
are indeed low. We also expect the import share to be relatively low in 
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immature industries, since US firms should be highly competitive in the 
domestic market. Examples here include business, professional and technical 
services where the export share is more than double the import share. But 
there is likely to be additional support for supposing that US firms have 
comparative advantage in immature industries when we emphasize the 
increasing importance in the global economy of the disintegration of 
production. Though there is not sufficient firm-level data on this develop-
ment, the tendency of US firms to outsource low value-added stages of 
production and retain high value-added stages reinforces our conclusion that 
business, professional and technical services, such as design, branding, 
marketing and service operations, are areas of US comparative advantage. 
It is more difficult to determine whether US firms are more successful in 
regard to relatively implastic as compared to more plastic investments, since 
an efficient organizational response of firms in neoclassical systems of 
regulation is the development of holding companies to carry out modest levels 
of plastic investment within comparatively large volumes of implastic 
investment. Thus firms in industries where plastic investments do occur, such 
as biotechnology giants with important laboratory divisions (for example, a 
Cargill or an Archer Daniels Midland), also engage in large amounts of 
relatively implastic investment. At the same time, the tendency of US firms to 
retain the high value-added portions of the production process may still 
provide some evidence of an emphasis on implastic forms of investment. 
When a firm such as Ford announces that it will reduce its involvement in 
manufacturing and assembly in order to concentrate on design, branding, 
marketing and service operations, it signals its intention to concentrate on 
implastic forms of investment, since these are relatively stable and transparent 
forms of business activity (though they are also relatively undeveloped and 
immature). Thus we take US firms' observable global activity in business and 
professional services as reflecting an increasing comparative advantage in 
immature industries and implastic forms of investment. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The continuing global integration of markets presents US corporations with 
an interesting landscape of opportunities for expansion and profit realization. 
The corporation governance system, the set of relationships that yield a 
structure through which the corporations' objectives and means are 
determined and its progress in reaching those ends are monitored, influences 
management's approach to global market opportunities. The forces of global 
competition and the relational aspects of the governance system create a 
duality of forces that corporations encounter when expanding globally, and 
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this duality is captured in the complex relationship that exists among trade and 
FDI strategies. 
This chapter attempts to detail the alternative paths of globalization that US 
industries have followed, and relate this to views of corporate governance 
theories of capital allocation and market penetration. The economists' 
traditional view of comparative (dis)advantage at the industry level, at least in 
manufacturing, now only pertains to a few industries, primarily the most 
labour-intensive industries. Rather what exists today is a 'kaleidoscope 
comparative advantage' (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994) where US corporations 
outsource low-value-added levels of production and focus on high-value-
added levels of production in which the US has a comparative advantage. 
Furthermore, the traditional view that corporations may either export goods 
or export capital, which means that trade and investment are substitute 
strategies, has given way to a realization that the relationship between trade 
and PDI is quite complex with a complementary relationship existing, at least 
among the developed nations. The bulk of US FDI, as it is directed to other 
developed nations, is directed by ownership-specific characteristics that 
complement US corporations' comparative advantage in the high-innovation, 
high-value-added levels of production. Hence, the empirical evidence on the 
complex trade-investment relationship reflects a complicated pattern of US 
corporations in globalization. 
Because we need to relate the data and theories at a much more 
disaggregated level, the clear predictions of the neoclassical economic model 
of corporate governance are somewhat blunted. Nonetheless, we do find 
evidence that US firms are successful in the global economy in immature 
industries and also mature industries which engage in high PDI andlor focus 
on high value-added stages of the production process. In addition, we find 
good reason to suppose that US firms are also successful in relatively 
implastic forms of investment, whether these types of investments are carried 
out in mature or immature industries. Further research into US firms' areas of 
comparative advantage in the world economy awaits better evidence and 
better understanding of the processes causing the disintegration of production 
while creating 'kaleidoscopic comparative advantage'. 
NOTES 
I. The OECD defines corporate governance as a set of relationships between a company's 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. providing a structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, the means of attaining those objectives are 
determined and performance is monitored (OECD, 1999b). 
2. These ratios were calculated from the 1996 Annual Survey of Manufactures, Department of 
Commerce. Capital expenditures include new and used capital expenditures. 
3. The Spearman Rank Correlation between the rank of FDI shares and export shares, 48 per 
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cent, is positive and significant at the I per cent level. The Spearman Rank Correlation 
between the rank ofFDI shares and external orientation, import shares, imported-input shares 
are statistically insignificant. 
4. See Quijano (1990) for information on the Bureau of Economic Analysis' statistics on 
foreign direct investment. 
5. This section draws on Dietl (1998). 
6. Misallocation costs may also take the form of non-diversification costs. 
7. Dietl (1998) argues that Germany exhibits a relational system of regulation, and Japan 
exhibits a hybrid system of regulation with origins in the relational system. 
8. Holding companies and multidivisional organizations own lOOper cent of their subsidiaries 
and are entitled to allocate 100 per cent of their subsidiaries' earnings. The legal structure of 
the fonner places more restrictions on doing so than that of the latter. 
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